We study oligopolistic competition in service markets where firms offer a service to customers. The service quality of a firm -from the perspective of a customerdepends on the level of congestion and the charged price. A firm can set a price for the service offered and additionally decides on the service capacity in order to mitigate congestion. The total profit of a firm is derived from the gained revenue minus the capacity investment cost. Firms simultaneously set capacities and prices in order to maximize their profit and customers subsequently choose the services with lowest combined cost (congestion and price). For this basic model, Johari, Weintraub and Van Roy [21] derived the first existence and uniqueness results of pure Nash equilibria assuming mild conditions on congestion functions. Their existence proof relies on Kakutani's fixed-point theorem and a key assumption for the theorem to work is that demand for service is elastic, that is, there is a smooth inverse demand function determining the volume of customers given the effective customers' costs.
Introduction
We consider a model for oligopolistic capacity and price competition in service markets exhibiting congestion effects. There is a set of firms offering a service to customers and the overall customer utility depends on the congestion level experienced and the price charged. In addition to setting a price, a firm can invest in installing capacity to reduce congestion. Firms compete against each other in the market by simultaneously choosing capacity and price levels while customers react subsequently choosing the most attractive firms (in terms of congestion-and price levels). This model captures many aspects of realistic oligopolistic markets such as road pricing in traffic networks (see Xiao, Yang and Han [30] and Zhang and Han [32] ) and competition among WIFIproviders or cloud computing platforms (see Acemoglu and Ozdaglar [2] and Anselmi et al. [4] ).
In a landmark paper, Johari, Weintraub and Van Roy [21] (JWVR for short) studied the fundamental question of existence, uniqueness and worst-case quality of pure Nash equilibria for this model. They derived several existence and uniqueness results under fairly general assumptions on the functional form of the congestion functions. Specifically, they showed that for models with elastic demand, a unique pure Nash equilibrium exists. The existence result is based on the Kakutani fixed-point theorem (see [22] and the generalizations of Fan and Glicksberg [17, 19] ) and crucially exploits the assumption that demand is elastic leading to non-emptyness of the best-response correspondences of firms. For the case of inelastic demand, that is, there is a fixed volume of customers requesting service, much less is known in terms of existence and uniqueness of equilibria. Many works in the transportation science and algorithmic game theory community (see, e.g., [7, 12, 13, 14, 31, 18] and [28, 8, 3, 16] , respectively) assume inelastic demand and this case is usually considered as fundamental base case. As we show in this paper, in terms of equilibrium existence, the case of inelastic demand is much more complicated compared to the seemingly more general case of elastic demands: the best-response correspondence may be empty in the "inelastic case" putting standard approaches out of reach. Besides this theoretical aspect, the case of inelastic demand is also interesting from a practical point of view as it applies to realistic situations (such as road pricing games), where customers have already made investments on a longer time-scale (like buying a car) so that they are not willing to opt out of the game.
Related Work
JWVR [21] derived several existence and uniqueness results for pure Nash equilibria assuming elastic demand of customers. The elasticity is modeled by a differentiable strictly decreasing inverse demand function. Depending on the generality of the allowed congestion cost functions, further concavity assumptions on the inverse demand function are imposed by JWVR. The existence proof is based on Kakutani's fixed-point theorem which crucially exploits (together with further convexity and compactness properties) that best-response correspondences of the firms are non-empty.
For the model with inelastic demand -that we consider in this paper -JWVR derive an existence result assuming homogeneous firms, that is, the cost function of every firm is equal. As shown by JWVR, homogeneity implies that there is only one symmetric equilibrium candidate profile. For this specific symmetric strategy profile, they directly prove stability using concavity arguments of the best-reply correspondences. This proof technique is clearly not applicable in the general non-homogeneous case. As already mentioned, a further difficulty stems from the fact that one cannot directly apply standard fixed-point arguments as even a best response of a firm might not exist.
Acemoglu, Bimpikis and Ozdaglar [1] study a capacity and price competition game assuming that the capacities represent "hard" capacities bounding the admissible customer volume for a firm. They observe that pure Nash equilibria do not exist and subsequently study a two-stage model, where in the first stage firms determine capacities and in a second stage they set prices. For this model, they investigate the existence and worst-case efficiency of equilibria (see also Kreps and Scheinkman [23] for earlier work on the two-stage model). Further models in which capacities are determined centrally in order to reduce the travel cost of the resulting Wardrop equilibria have been considered in the (bilevel) optimization community for some time already, see [11, 24] . In a very recent work [29] , Schmand, Skopalik and Schröder study existence and inefficiency of equilibria in a network investment game in which the firms invest in edges of a series-parallel graph (but do not directly set prices).
Our Results and Proof Techniques
We study in this paper oligopolistic capacity and price competition assuming that there is a fixed population of customers requesting service. This assumption applies to road pricing games, where customers usually own a car and are not willing to opt out of the game given that prices range in realistically bounded domains. Consequently, our model allows for the possibility of a priori upper bounds with respect to the prices set by the firms. This situation appears naturally, if there are legislative regulations imposing a hard price cap in the market (see Correa et al. [9] and Harks et al. [20] and further references therein). As reported in Correa et al. [9] , even different price caps for different firms is current practice in the highway market of Santiago de Chile, where 12 different operators set tolls on different urban highways each with a unique price cap. While firm-specific price caps generalize the model of JWVR, we impose, on the other hand, more restrictive assumptions on the congestion functions, that is, they are assumed to be linear with respect to the volume of customers and inverse linear with respect to the installed capacity.
As our first result, we completely characterize the structure of best-response correspondences of firms; including the possibility of non-existence of best-replies (Theorem 3.6). Our second main result then establishes the existence of equilibria (Theorem 4.6). For the proof we use the concept of C-security introduced by McLennan, Monteiro and Tourky [25] , which in turn resembles ideas of Reny [27] . A strategy profile is called C-secure, if each player has a pure strategy guaranteeing a certain utility value, even if the other players play some perturbed strategy within a (small enough) neighbourhood. Furthermore, for each slightly perturbed strategy profile, there is a player whose perturbed strategy can in some sense be strictly separated from her securing strategies. Intuitively, the concept of securing strategies means that those strategies are robust to other players' small deviations. The main result of McLennan, Monteiro and Tourky [25] states that a game admits an equilibrium, if every non-equilibrium profile is C-secure. It is important to note that the concept of C-security does not rely on quasi-concavity of utility functions nor on their continuity. With our characterization of best-response correspondences at hand, we show that the capacity and price game with inelastic demand, linear congestion functions and price caps is C-secure and, thus, admits pure Nash equilibria. As our third main result, we show that there is a unique equilibrium (Theorem 5.7). The proof technique follows the general approach as in JWVR [21] , however, since our model allows for price caps, some new ideas are required. We finally study the worst case efficiency of the unique equilibrium compared to a natural benchmark, in which we relax the equilibrium conditions of the firms, but not the equilibrium conditions of the customers. We show that the unique equilibrium might be arbitrarily inefficient (Theorem 6.1).
Model
There is a set N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2, of firms offering a service to customers. Customers are represented by the continuum [0, 1] (each consumer is assumed to be infinitesimally small and represented by a number in [0, 1]) and we denote by P = {x ∈ R n ≥0 | i∈N x i = 1} the standard simplex of assignments of customers to firms. 1 The effective quality of the service of firm i offered to a customer depends on two key factors: the level of congestion ℓ i (x i , z i ) and the price p i ≥ 0 charged by the firm. The congestion function ℓ i (x i , z i ) depends on the volume of customers x i and the service capacity z i ≥ 0 installed. Clearly ℓ i (x i , z i ) grows with the volume of customers x i to be served but decreases with the service capacity z i . If no capacity is installed, i.e. z i = 0, we assume infinite congestion, and for the case that z i > 0, we assume that congestion depends linearly on the volume of customers and inverse-linearly on the installed capacity, that is,
where a i > 0 and b i ≥ 0 are given parameters for i ∈ N . Note that the case z i = 0 can be interpreted as if firm i is just opting out of the market and does not offer the service at all. Each firm i additionally decides on a price p i ∈ [0, C i ] which is charged for offering service to its customers, where C i > 0 is a given price cap. For a capacity vector z = (z 1 , . . . , z n ) with i∈N z i > 0, i.e. the service is offered by some firms, and a price vector p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ), customers choose rationally the most attractive service in terms of the effective costs, that is, congestion and price experienced. This is expressed by the Wardrop equilibrium conditions:
holds for all i, j ∈ N with x i > 0. Note that for given capacities z = 0 and prices p, there is exactly one x ∈ P satisfying the Wardrop equilibrium conditions (see, e.g., [10] ). Call this flow x = x(z, p) the Wardrop flow induced by (z, p). In particular, there exists a constant K ≥ 0 such that c i (x, z, p) = K holds for each i ∈ N with x i > 0, and c i (x, z, p) ≥ K holds for each i ∈ N with x i = 0. For a Wardrop flow x, we call the corresponding constant K the (routing) cost of x.
If we denote the per-unit cost of installed capacity by γ i > 0, i ∈ N , the profit function of a firm i ∈ N can now be represented as
We assume that each firm i seeks to maximize her own profit. For each firm i ∈ N , let S i := {s i = (z i , p i ) : 0 ≤ z i , 0 ≤ p i ≤ C i } be the strategy set. A vector s consisting of strategies s i = (z i , p i ) ∈ S i , i ∈ N is called a strategy profile, and S := i∈N S i denotes the set of strategy profiles. We will usually write a strategy profile s ∈ S in the form s = (z, p), where z denotes the vector consisting of all capacities z i for i ∈ N , and p is the vector of prices p i for i ∈ N . The profit of firm i for a strategy profile s = (z, p) is then defined as Π i (s) := Π i (z, p). Furthermore, we write x(s) := x(z, p) for the Wardrop-flow induced by s = (z, p) and K(s) := K(z, p) for the routing cost of x(s). For firm i, denote by
for the strategy profile where firm i chooses s i = (z i , p i ) ∈ S i , and the other firms choose
is a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) of the thus defined capacity and price competition game, if for each firm i ∈ N :
. For given strategies s −i ∈ S −i of the other firms, the best-response correspondence of firm i is defined as
If s −i is clear from the context, we just write BR i . We conclude this section with the following fundamental result about the continuity of the profit functions. We will use Theorem 2.1, which completely characterizes the strategy profiles s having the property that all profit functions Π i , i ∈ N , are continuous in s, several times during the rest of the paper. Proof. We start with the strategy profile s = (z, p) = (0, 0) and show that for each firm i, her profit function Π i is continuous in s.
Now consider s = (z, p) ∈ S with z = 0. We again need to show that all profit functions Π i , i ∈ N , are continuous in s. Since z = 0, we get that
where s ′ 1 denotes the strategies of the firms in N + , and s ′ 2 denotes the strategies of the firms in N \ N + . Now let i ∈ N . We need to show that Π i is continuous in s = (z, p). For all s ′ ∈ S with
Thus it is sufficient to show that x i is continuous in s = (s 1 , s 2 ). The idea of the proof is to show that, for a slightly perturbed strategy profile (s ′ 1 , s ′ 2 ), the difference between x i (s) and x i (s ′ 1 , s 2 ), as well as the difference between
, is small. In the following, let s ′ ∈ S with ||s − s ′ || < δ 1 . It is well known ( [5] ) that x(s ′ ) is the unique optimal solution of the following optimization problem Q = Q(s ′ ):
Furthermore, x j (s ′ ) = 0 for j / ∈ N + (s ′ ). Therefore, the values (x j (s ′ )) j∈N + (s ′ ) are the unique optimal solution of
which is equivalent to
By Berge's theorem of the maximum [6] , for all ε > 0 there is
That is, x is continuous in s if we only allow changes in s 1 , but not in s 2 . Furthermore, if q(s ′ ) denotes the optimal objective function value of Q(s ′ ), and if only changes in s 1 are allowed, q also is continuous in s, i.e. for all ε > 0 there is
We now distinguish between the two cases that z i > 0 or z i = 0. First consider the case z i = 0, that is, i / ∈ N + , and let ε > 0. Note that x i (s) = 0, thus we need to find δ > 0 such that |x i (s) − x i (s ′ )| = x i (s ′ ) < ε for all s ′ ∈ S with ||s − s ′ || < δ. To this end, define
2(q(s)+1−b i ε) }, else, and let s ′ ∈ S ′ with ||s − s ′ || < δ. In particular,
Then, by definition of δ, we get the following contradiction:
Therefore, x i (s ′ ) ≤ ε holds, showing that x i is continuous in s if i / ∈ N + . Now consider the case i ∈ N , i.e. z i > 0. For ε > 0, we need to find δ > 0 such that |x i (s) − x i (s ′ )| < ε for all s ′ ∈ S with ||s − s ′ || < δ. To this end, define
and let s ′ ∈ S with ||s−s ′ || < δ. In particular, ||s−(
We now use a result about the sensitivity of Wardrop equilibria due to Englert et al. [15, Theorem 2] . They show that if firm j is deleted from the game, the resulting change in the Wardrop flow can be bounded by the flow that j received. More formally, if x ∈ [0, 1] n is the Wardrop flow for the game with firms N , and x ′ ∈ [0, 1] n−1 is the Wardrop flow if firm j is deleted from the game,
Obviously, changing firm j's capacity from z ′ j > 0 to z j = 0 has the same effect on the Wardrop flow as deleting firm j. Therefore, if we change, one after another, the capacities of all firms j ∈ N + having z ′ j > 0 to z j = 0, we get (note that the flow values for j ∈ N + can always be always upper-bounded by ε/(2n)):
Using this, we now get the desired inequality:
Altogether we showed that all profit functions Π i are continuous at s = (z, p) if z = 0.
To complete the proof, it remains to show that if all profit functions Π i , i ∈ N , are continuous in s = (z, p), then z = 0 or (z, p) = (0, 0) holds. We show this by contraposititon, thus assume that s = (z, p) fulfills z = 0 and p = 0. We need to show that there is a firm i such that Π i is not continuous in s. To this end, let i ∈ N with p i > 0. Define the sequence of strategy profiles s n by (z n j , p n j ) := (z j , p j ) for all j = i, and (z n i , p n i ) := ( 1 n , p i ). Obviously, s n → s for n → ∞. But for the profits, we get
Since Π i (s) = 0, this shows that Π i is not continuous in s.
Characterization of Best Responses
The aim of this section is to derive a complete characterization of the best-response correspondences of the firms. We will make use of this characterization in all our main results, i.e. existence, uniqueness and quality of PNE. Given a firm i ∈ N and fixed strategies s −i = (z −i , p −i ) ∈ S −i for the other firms, we characterize the set BR i of best responses of firm i to s −i . To this end, we distinguish between the two cases that z −i = 0 (Subsection 3.1) and z −i = 0 (Subsection 3.2). Subsection 3.3 then contains the derived complete characterization. In Subsection 3.4, we discuss how our results about the best responses influence the applicability of Kakutani's fixed point theorem.
The Case z
In this subsection, assume that the strategies s −i = (z −i , p −i ) of the other firms fulfill z −i = 0. Under this assumption, firm i does not have a best response to s −i :
Proof. Whenever firm i chooses a strategy (z i , p i ) with z i > 0, then x i = 1 holds for the induced Wardrop-flow x, thus firm i's profit is p i − γ i z i . On the other hand, any strategy (z i , p i ) with z i = 0 yields a profit of 0. Thus, firm i's profit depends solely on her own strategy (z i , p i ), and can be stated as follows:
The Case z −i = 0
In this subsection, assume that the strategies
since it yields nonnegative profit. Thus, BR i can be described as the set of optimal solutions of the following optimization problem (P i ):
(P i ) has an optimal solution, since the feasible set of (P i ) is compact and Π i is continuous in (z i , p i ) (see Theorem 2.1), and thus the theorem of Weierstrass can be applied. Since BR i can be described as the set of optimal solutions of (P i ), we get BR i = ∅. Note that (P i ) is a bilevel optimization problem (since x(z i , p i ) can be described as the optimal solution of a minimization problem ( [5] )), and these problems are known to be notoriously hard to solve. The characterization of BR i that we derive here has the advantage that it only uses ordinary optimization problems, namely the following two (1-dimensional) optimization problems in the variable K ∈ R,
, where
Note that x i is a continuous function which is equal to 1 for 0 ≤ K ≤ min{b j + p j : j ∈ N + }, and strictly decreasing for
. Furthermore, the function x i is closely related to Wardrop-flows, as described in the following lemma:
Proof. We start with 1., so let
for j ∈ N with z j = 0,
as desired. Now we show 2., so let K ≥ 0 with x i (K) > 0 and let (z i , p i ) ∈ S i be a strategy with z i > 0 and
It is clear that x j > 0 holds for all j ∈ N + with b j + p j < K, and
We now show that x fulfills the Wardrop equilibrium conditions. The uniqueness of the Wardrop-flow then implies 
It is now easy to see that x fulfills the Wardrop equilibrium conditions.
In the following lemmata, we analyze the connection between (P 1 i ) and (P 2 i ) and the optimal solutions of (P i ).
2. If K is feasible for problem (P 2 i ), the tuple (z i , p i ) defined by
Proof. We start with 1., so assume that K is feasible for problem (P
Using this, we can now show that firm i's profit for (z i , p i ) equals the objective function value of K for (P 1 i ):
It remains to show that (z i , p i ) is feasible for (P i ). We have already seen that z i > 0, since
Therefore, (z i , p i ) is feasible for (P i ). Now turn to statement 2.. Assume that K is feasible for problem (P
The profit of firm i thus becomes
The feasibility of K for (P 2 i ) yields f 2 i (K) ≥ 0. As in 1., this implies z i ≤ C i /γ i . We already showed z i > 0, and 0 < p i = C i holds, thus (z i , p i ) is feasible for (P i ), completing the proof.
In particular, Lemma 3.3 shows that any optimal solution of (P 1 i ) or (P 2 i ) yields a feasible strategy for (P i ) with the same objective fuction value. The next lemma shows that for certain optimal solutions of (P i ), the converse is also true.
be an optimal solution of (P i ) and
, then exactly one of the following two cases holds:
is an optimal solution for the following optimization problem:
Note that the optimal solutions of (P) correspond to all best responses for firm i such that x * remains the Wardrop equilibrium. Reformulating the equality constraint in (P) yields
Thus (P) is equivalent to the following problem
Let f be the objective function of (P ′ ) and consider the derivative
that f is strictly increasing for 0 < z i < a i /γ i · x * i and strictly decreasing for z i > a i /γ i · x * i . We now distinguish between the two cases that
i is feasible for (P ′ ), it is the unique optimal solution of (P ′ ). But since z * i is also optimal for (P ′ ), we get
For the profit of firm i, we get
It remains to show that K * is optimal for (P 1 i ). For feasibility, we need 2
Therefore, K * is feasible for (P 1 i ). The optimality follows from Lemma 3.3 and the optimality of
Now turn to the case that z i = a i /γ i · x * i is not feasible for (P ′ ). Since (P ′ ) has an optimal solution (namely z * i ), we get that 0 <
is the unique optimal solution for (P ′ ). This shows
The profit of firm i becomes
Since x i (K * ) = x * i > 0 and the profit is nonnegative,
holds. Finally,
which completes the proof since we showed that K * is a feasible solution of problem (P 2 i ) (optimality follows from Lemma 3.3 and the optimality of (z * i , p * i ) for (P i )). In the next lemma, we analyze existence of optimal solutions for the problems (P 
Assume that (P
Proof. We start with 1., so assume that (P 1 i ) is feasible. Note that the feasible solution set I 1 of (P 1 i ) either is of the form
or not. We now analyze the objective function
). Let us start with the case that x i (K) = 1 for all K ∈ I 1 , which is equivalent to the fact that
holds, since x i is continuous and
increasing over I 1 and reaches its unique maximum at K = √ a i γ i + b i + C i . Thus we showed
. This means that we can subdivide I 1 as follows: Consider all different values b j + p j for j ∈ N + which are contained in I 1 , and let α 1 < α 2 < · · · < α k denote these values in ascending order. If we increase K from 2 √ a i γ i + b i , the set N (K) remains constant until we reach α 1 . Immediately after α 1 it increases, and then it is again constant until α 2 , and so on. This yields that f 1 i is differentiable on the (open) intervals where N (K) is constant. The first and second derivative of f 1 i then are
Since we assumed
i is continuous at α ℓ . We now show that the slope of f 1 i does not increase at α ℓ , where we mean that lim
holds, which shows that f 1 i is strictly concave over I 1 and (P 1 i ) has at most one optimal solution. Consider
Since K = α ℓ is feasible for (P 1 i ), we get α ℓ ≥ 2 √ a i γ i + b i and thus the desired inequality
Finally, we show that (P 1 i ) actually has an optimal solution. If
holds, this follows since f 1 i is continuous. For
The remaining case in the proof of 1. is 2 √ a i γ i +b i ≤ min{b j +p j : j ∈ N + } < √ a i γ i +b i +C i . By a combination of the argumentation in the other two cases, we get that f 1 i is strictly increasing until K = min{b j + p j : j ∈ N + }, and strictly concave afterwards, so that (P 1 i ) has at most one optimal solution. By a similar argumentation as in the second case, (P 1 i ) also has an optimal solution, completing the proof of 1.. Now consider 2. and assume that (P 2 i ) is feasible. Let I 2 be the feasible solution set of (P 2 i ). Note that I 2 is always an interval with positive length, so there exists K ∈ I 2 with K >
In the following, we will show that
is strictly concave over I 2 . This immediately implies that (P 2 i ) has at most one optimal solution. For C i ≤ √ a i γ i , we also get the existence of an optimal solution by using the strict quasiconcavity and nonnegativity of f 2 i together with f 2 i (
i is strictly quasiconcave. As for (P 1 i ), subdivide I 2 by using the values
i is differentiable on the open intervalls where N (K) is constant and we get:
, the second derivative is negative, and thus f 2 i is strictly concave on the open intervals where N (K) is constant. Now consider K = β ℓ where N (K) increases. Note that f 2 i is continuous at β ℓ . We now show that the slope of f 2 i does not increase at β ℓ , i.e.
holds, which implies that f 2 i is strictly concave over I 2 . Consider
≥ 0, and thus the desired inequality
completing the proof of 2.. Finally we show 3., so assume that K * 1 and K * 2 are the optimal solutions of (P 1 i ) and (P 2 i ).
holds. This implies that the feasible solution set of (P
holds. If additionally the slope of f 1 i inK is greater or equal than the slope of f 2 i inK, i.e.
by using our analysis of f 1 i and f 2 i from 1. and 2.. The remaining inequality about the slopes follows from
where the inequality follows from the definition of x i and √ a i γ i ≤ C i .
The Characterization
The following theorem provides a complete characterization of the best response correspondence. We will make use of this characterization several times during the rest of the paper.
Theorem 3.6. For a firm i ∈ N and fixed strategies s −i = (z −i , p −i ) ∈ S −i of the other firms, the set BR i = BR i (s −i ) of best responses of firm i to s −i is given as indicated in the following Table 1 , where the first column contains BR i and the second column contains the conditions on s −i under which BR i has the stated form. For j = 1, 2, K * j denotes the unique optimal solution of problem (P j i ), if this problem has an optimal solution. Furthermore, for the cases where s i = (z i , p i ) is the unique best response of firm i to s −i , we get z i > 0 and Π i (s i , s −i ) > 0 (since the uniqueness obviously implies these properties).
Proof. We show that the case distinction covers all possible cases, and the given representation for BR i is correct for each case. If z −i = 0, Lemma 3.1 shows BR i = ∅. For the rest of the proof, assume z −i = 0. Therefore, firm i has at least one best response to s −i . If (P are both infeasible, Lemma 3.4 implies that each best response (z i , p i ) fulfills z i = 0. Therefore,
For the remaining proof, assume that at least one of (P 1 i ) and (P 2 i ) is feasible. First consider the case that (P 2 i ) has an optimal solution. By 2. of Lemma 3.5, (P 2 i ) has a unique optimal solution K * 2 with f 2 i (K * 2 ) > 0. Lemma 3.3 shows that each best response yields a profit of at least f 2 i (K * 2 ) > 0. In particular, there is no best response (z i , p i ) with z i = 0. To achieve BR i = {(
, C i )}, it remains to show that each best response (z i , p i ) with z i > 0
Note that either (P 1 i ) is infeasible, or it has a unique optimal solution K * 1 with f 1 i (K * 1 ) < f 2 i (K * 2 ) (see 1. and 3. from Lemma 3.5). In both cases, Lemma 3.4 yields that each best response (z i , p i ) with z i > 0 fulfills (z i , p i ) = (
showing the claim for the case that (P 2 i ) has an optimal solution. Now assume that (P 2 i ) does not have an optimal solution (either (P 2 i ) is infeasible, or it is feasible, but the maximum is not attained). We first show that (P
) is feasible since we assumed that at least one of the two problems is feasible. Otherwise (P 2 i ) is feasible, but does not have an optimal solution. Then, C i > √ a i γ i follows from 2. of Lemma 3.5, and
) is feasible. By 1. of Lemma 3.5 we then get that (P 1 i ) has a unique optimal solution K * 1 . Furthermore, each best response (z i , p i ) Lemma 3.4) . To complete the proof, we need to show that there is no best response (z i , p i ) with z i = 0. This follows from Lemma 3.3 and 
But this now implies that (P

Discussion
We now briefly discuss consequences of the characterization of the best-reponse correspondences with respect to applying Kakutani's fixed point theorem [22] (or related results such as those in Fan and Glicksberg [17, 19] ). Kakutani's theorem requires that for each firm i and each vector s −i = (z −i , p −i ) of strategies of the other firms, the set BR i (s −i ) of best responses is nonempty (and convex). But, as we have seen in Lemma 3.1, the set BR i (s −i ) can be empty, namely if z −i = 0. On the other hand, a strategy profile with z −i = 0 for some firm i will never be a PNE (obviously).
A first natural approach to overcome the problem of empty best responses is the following. Given a strategy profile s = (z, p) such that z −i = 0 for some firm i, redefine, for each such firm i, the set BR i (s −i ) by some suitable nonempty closed convex set. "Suitable" here means that the correspondence BR i should have a closed graph and at the same time s must not be a fixed point of the correspondence BR = (BR i ) i∈N . But unfortunately, these two goals are not compatible: For the strategy profile s = (z, p) with (z i , p i ) = (0, C i ) for all firms i, the closed graph property requires (0, C i ) ∈ BR i (s −i ) for all i, which implies that s is a fixed point of BR.
Another intuitive idea is to consider a game in which each firm has an initial capacity of some ε > 0. If this game has a PNE for each ε, the limit for ε going to zero should be a PNE for our original capacity and price competition game. For the game with at least ε capacity, one can also characterize the best-response correspondence (now by optimal solutions of three optimization problems), but the main problem is that concavity of the objective functions may be lost, thus it is not clear if the best-response correspondence is convex. Therefore, it is not clear how to apply Kakutani's fixed point theorem. Instead, we will use an existence result due to McLennan et al. [25] , see Section 4. 2 
Existence of Equilibria
In this section, we show that each capacity and price competition game has a PNE. A frequently used tool to show existence of PNE is Kakutani's fixed point theorem. But, as discussed in Subsection 3.4, we cannot directly apply this result to show existence of PNE. Furthermore, the existence theorem of Reny [27] can also not be used, since a capacity and price competition game is not quasiconcave in general. Instead, we turn to another existence result due to McLennan, Monteiro and Tourky [25] . They introduced a concept called C-security and they showed that if the game is C-secure at each strategy profile which is not a PNE, then a PNE exists. Informally, the game is C-secure at a strategy profile s if there is a vector α ∈ R n satisfying the following two properties: First, each firm i has some securing strategy for α i which is robust to small deviations of the other firms, i.e. firm i always achieves a profit of at least α i by playing this strategy even if the other firms slightly deviate from their strategies in s −i . The second property requires for each slightly perturbed strategy profile s ′ resulting from s, that there is at least one firm i such that her perturbed strategy s ′ i can (in some sense) be strictly separated from all strategies achieving a profit of α i , so in particular from all her securing strategies. One can think of firm i being "not happy" with her perturbed strategy s ′ i since she could achieve a higher profit. This already indicates the connection between a strategy profile, which is not a PNE, and C-security. We will see that for certain strategy profiles, α i can be chosen as the profit that firm i gets by playing a best response to s −i . 3 Then, firm i's securing strategies for α i are related to her set of best responses, and we need to "strictly separate" these best responses from s i . At this point, our characterization of best responses in Theorem 3.6 becomes useful.
We now formally describe McLennan et al.'s result in our context. First of all, note that they consider games with compact convex strategy sets and bounded profit functions. In a capacity and price competition game, the strategy set
is not compact a priory. But, since z i will never be larger than C i /γ i in any best response, and thus in any PNE (see the discussion on page 7), we can redefine
without changing the set of PNE of the game, for any firm i. Furthermore, this also does not change the best responses, so Theorem 3.6 continues to hold. Using the redefined strategies, for any firm i and any strategy profile s, the profit function of firm i is bounded by
For a strategy profile s ∈ S, firm i ∈ N and α i ∈ R let
where conv B i (s, α i ) denotes the convex hull of B i (s, α i ). Definition 4.1. A firm i can secure a payoff α i ∈ R on S ′ ⊆ S, if there is some s i ∈ S i such that s i ∈ B i (s ′ , α i ) for all s ′ ∈ S ′ . We say that firm i can secure α i at s ∈ S, if she can secure α i on U ∩ S for some open set U with s ∈ U . (ii) For any s ′ ∈ S ′ , there exists some firm i with
The game is C-secure at s ∈ S, if it is C-secure on U ∩ S for some open set U with s ∈ U .
We can now state the existence result of McLennan et al.:
Theorem 4.3 (Proposition 2.7 in [25] ). If the game is C-secure at each s ∈ S that is not a PNE, then the game has a PNE.
We now turn to capacity and price competition games and show the existence of a PNE by using Theorem 4.3, i.e., we show that if a given strategy profile s = (z, p) is not a PNE, then the game is C-secure at s. To this end, we distinguish between the two cases that there are at least two firms i with z i > 0 (Lemma 4.4), or not (Lemma 4.5). Both lemmata together then imply the desired existence result. Note that the mentioned case distinction is equivalent to the case distinction that each firm i has a best response for s −i , or there is at least one firm i with BR i (s −i ) = ∅ (see Theorem 3.6).
We start with the case that all best responses exist. The proof of the following lemma follows an argument in [25, p. 1647f] where McLennan et al. show that Proposition 4.3 implies the existence result of Nishimura and Friedman [26] .
Lemma 4.4. Let s = (z, p) ∈ S be a strategy profile which is not a PNE. Assume that there are at least two firms i ∈ N such that z i > 0 holds. Then the game is C-secure at s.
In the proof of Lemma 4.4, we will use the following notation. Let S ′ ⊆ S be a subset of the strategy profiles and i ∈ N . By S ′ i ⊆ S i , we denote the projection of S ′ into S i , the set of firm i's strategies, and S ′ −i ⊆ S −i denotes the projection of S ′ into S −i = j∈N \{i} S j , the set of strategies of the other firms.
Proof of Lemma 4.4. Since z has at least two positive entries z i , all strategy profiles s ′ = (z ′ , p ′ ) in a sufficiently small open neighbourhood of s also have at least two entries z ′ i > 0. In the following, whenever we speak of an open set U containing s, we implicitly require U small enough to fulfill this property. Furthermore, since it is clear that we are only interested in the elements of U which are strategy profiles, we simply write U instead of U ∩ S. Consequently, s ′ ∈ U denotes a strategy profile contained in U .
Since we assumed that at least two firms have positive capacity at s = (z, p), we get that z −i = 0 holds for each firm i. Thus, by Theorem 3.6, each firm i has a best response to s −i , and the set of best responses either is a singleton, or consists of all strategies (0, p i ) for 0 ≤ p i ≤ C i . Since s is not a PNE, there is at least one firm j such that s j = (z j , p j ) is not a best response, i.e. either s j = s * j for the unique best response s * j , or z j > 0, and all best responses s * j = (z * j , p * j ) fulfill z * j = 0. In both cases it is clear that there is a hyperplane H which strictly separates s j from the set of best responses to s −j .
We now turn to the properties in Definition 4.2. For each firm i, let s * i be a best response of firm i to s −i and β i := Π i (s * i , s −i ). We know from Theorem 2.1 that Π i is continuous in (s * i , s −i ) for each firm i. Therefore, for each ε > 0, there is an open set U = U (ε) containing s such that Π i (s * i , s ′ −i ) ≥ β i −ε for each s ′ ∈ U and each firm i. That is, each firm i can secure β i −ε on U (ε). Now turn to the second property and consider firm j. We now show that there is an ε > 0 and an open set U ⊆ U (ε) containing s, such that for each s ′ ∈ U , the hyperplane H (which strictly separates s j and B j (s, β j )) also strictly separates s ′ j and Figure 1 for an illustration). Since each firm i can secure β i −ε on U ⊆ U (ε), both properties of Definition 4.2 are fulfilled, completing the proof.
To this end, choose an open set V containing B j (s, β j ) such that H strictly separates s j and V . Since S j \V is a compact set and Π j is continuous in ( s j , s −j ) for all s j ∈ S j \V (by Theorem 2.1), we get that f (s −j ) := max{Π j ( s j , s −j ) :
Note that if we consider, for an open neighbourhoodŪ of s and for fixed s ′ −j ∈Ū −j , the problem of maximizing Π j ( s j , s ′ −j ) subject to s j ∈ S j \ V , Berge's theorem of the maximum [6] yields that f (s ′ −j ) := max{Π j ( s j , s ′ −j ) : s j ∈ S j \ V } is a continuous function. Using the continuity of f , there is an open set U ⊆ U (ε) containing s such that f (s ′ −j ) < β j −ε for all s ′ −j ∈ U −j . Additionally, let U be small enough that H strictly separates U j and V . Now we have the desired properties: For each s ′ ∈ U and for each s j ∈ S j \V , we get Π j ( s j , s ′ −j ) < β j − ε, thus B j (s ′ , β j − ε) ⊂ V . Since s ′ j ∈ U j and H strictly separates U j and V , we get that H strictly separates s ′ j and B j (s ′ , β j − ε), as desired. Figure 1 : Illustration of the proof construction for the case B j (s, β j ) = {s * j }. Note that it is not necessary that
It remains to analyze the strategy profiles s = (z, p) with at most one positive z i .
Lemma 4.5. Let s = (z, p) ∈ S be a strategy profile such that z i > 0 holds for at most one firm i (note that these profiles cannot be PNE). Then the game is C-secure at s.
Proof. We distinguish between the two cases that there is a firm with positive capacity, or not. First consider the case that z i > 0 for firm i, and z j = 0 for all j = i.
there is an open ball U with center s such that firm i can secure α i on U ∩ S =: S ′ (note that firm i can secure each profit < C i by choosing U sufficiently small), and
It is clear that each firm j = i can secure α j = 0 on S ′ (by any strategy with z j = 0). In this way, property (i) of C-security is fulfilled. For property (ii), let
To this end, note that any strategy
Clearly, any strategy in C i (s ′ , α i ), i.e. any convex combination of strategies in B i (s ′ , α i ), then also has this property. Since
, as desired. Thus we showed that the game is C-secure at s if one firm has positive capacity. Now turn to the case that z i = 0 for all i ∈ N . We further distinguish between two subcases, namely that there is a firm i with p i < C i , or all prices are at their upper bounds.
First consider the subcase that p i < C i holds for firm i. Choose α i with p i < α i < C i . There is an open ball U with center s such that firm i can secure α i on U ∩ S =: S ′ , and p ′ i < α i holds for each s ′ = (z ′ , p ′ ) ∈ S ′ . By setting α j := 0 for all j = i, property (i) of C-security is fulfilled. For property (ii), let s ′ = (z ′ , p ′ ) ∈ S ′ . Our assumption about U yields p ′ i < α i . On the other hand, any strategy s
In particular, this holds for any strategy in
Therefore, the game is C-secure at s for the case that all z i are zero, and there is a firm i with p i < C i .
It remains to consider the case that (z i , p i ) = (0, C i ) holds for all firms i. For each firm i, choose α i with (1 − a i 2(a i +C i ) )C i < α i < C i . Note that this implies
There is an open ball U with center s such that each firm i can secure α i on U ∩ S =: S ′ , and z ′ i < 1 holds for each profile s ′ = (z ′ , p ′ ) ∈ S ′ . Thus, property (i) of C-security is fulfilled. For property (ii), let s ′ = (z ′ , p ′ ) ∈ S ′ . In the following, s * i = (z * i , p * i ) denotes a strategy of firm i
Since n ≥ 2, there is at least one firm i with
follows since z * i > 0 and p * i > α i holds for any strategy (z * i , p * i ) achieving a profit of at least α i . Thus we can assume w.l.o.g. that z ′ i > 0 and p ′ i > α i holds. We can furthermore assume w.l.o.g. that
achieving a profit of at least α i , and thus
has the following properties:
We now show that each strategy
and completing the proof. Assume, by contradiction, that there is a strategy s * i = (z * i , p * i ) which achieves a profit of α i and fulfills
holds, we can derive the following properties:
Reformulating this inequality and using (2) and (1) then yields
The inequality
, which contradicts (4).
It remains to show (3). The property K(s
Together with z * i ≤ z ′ i and p * i > α i , this leads to the following contradiction, completing the proof:
Using Theorem 4.3 together with the Lemmata 4.4 and 4.5 now yields the existence of a PNE:
Theorem 4.6. Every capacity and price competition game has a pure Nash equilibrium.
We remark here that in any PNE (z, p), there are at least two firms i with z i > 0.
Uniqueness of Equilibria
As we have seen in the last section, a capacity and price competition game always has a PNE. In this section we show that this equilbrium is essentially unique. With essentially we mean that if (z, p) and (z ′ , p ′ ) are two different PNE, and i ∈ N is a firm such that
For a PNE s = (z, p), denote by N + (z, p) := {i ∈ N : z i > 0} the set of firms with positive capacity (note that |N + (z, p)| ≥ 2 and N + (z, p) = {i ∈ N : x i (s) > 0}). For i ∈ N + (z, p), let (P 1 i )(s −i ) and (P 2 i )(s −i ) be the two auxiliary problems from Section 3. 4 By Lemma 3.4, the routing cost K(z, p) is an optimal solution of either (P 1 i )(s −i ) or (P 2 i )(s −i ). We denote by N + 1 (z, p) the set of firms i ∈ N + (z, p) such that K(z, p) is an optimal solution of (P 1 i )(s −i ), and N + 2 (z, p) contains the firms i ∈ N + (z, p) such that K(z, p) is an optimal solution of (P
The proofs in this section are similar to the proofs that Johari et al. [21] use to derive their uniqueness results. However, since our model includes price caps, some new ideas are required, in particular the decomposition of
We first derive further necessary equilibrium conditions (by using the KKT conditions) which will become useful in the remaining analysis.
Lemma 5.1. Let s = (z, p) be a PNE with x := x(z, p) and
Proof. Since (z, p) is a PNE, p j > 0 and x j > 0 holds for all j ∈ N + , and x k = 0 holds for k / ∈ N + . Furthermore, (z i , p i ) is a best response for firm i to s −i and K = a j x j z j + b j + p j holds for all j ∈ N + . Altogether we get that (z i , p i , (x j ) j∈N + ) is an optimal solution for the following optimization problem:
It is straightforward to show that the LICQ is fulfilled for (z i , p i , (x j ) j∈ N ), thus the KKT conditions are fulfilled. We get the following equations:
We now distinguish between the two cases p i < C i and p i = C i . In the first case, µ = 0 and (6) yields
Plugging this in (7) leads to
for all 4 In Section 3, we considered fixed strategies s−i, thus we just used (P 1 i ) and (P 2 i ) for the problems corresponding to s−i. In this section, we need to consider different strategy profiles, thus we now write (P The other case is p i = C i . The formula for z i follows from K =
which shows the desired equality.
In the next lemma, we introduce two functions Γ 1 i and Γ 2 i for each firm i and derive useful properties of these functions. 
If
Proof. 1. is clear from the definition of Γ 1 i and Γ 2 i , so turn to 2. and let i ∈ N + 1 . Lemma 3.4 yields
, but Lemma 5.1 yields the stated equality also for this case.) Now define
x i , we now rewrite K as follows:
Using this we get 2.: 
Rearranging and using the definition of B yields
.
and thus 3.:
4. now follows from 2. and 3. as follows:
It remains to show 5..
It remains to show
, and in particular yields a better objective function value than
We thus get
where the last inequality follows from
which leads to
as desired.
Now we turn to the desired uniqueness of the equilibrium. We start with the following lemma. Summing over all firms i ∈ N + yields B = B ′ , as desired:
In the previous lemma, we showed that given a fixed subset N + ⊆ N and a fixed disjoint decomposition N + = N Using that K < K and i∈N For the uniqueness of the PNE, it remains to show that there is at most one set N + such that a PNE (z, p) with N + (z, p) = N + exists. To this end, we first show that each firm i has a certain threshold K * i such that, for any PNE (z, p), firm i has z i > 0 if and only if K(z, p) > K * i . Lemma 5.5. For each i ∈ N , define + b i + C i < K. In the second case, i.e.
√ a i γ i ≤ C i and K * i = 2 √ a i γ i + b i , the cost K either is optimal for (P 
